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A Trap at the Escape from the Trap? 
Some Demographic Structural Factors  
of Political Instability in Modernizing 
Social Systems*1 
 
Andrey V. Korotayev, Sergey Yu. Malkov,  
and Leonid E. Grinin 
 
Abstract 
The escape from the ‘Malthusian trap’ is shown to tend to generate in a rather 
systematic way quite serious political upheavals. Some demographic structural 
mechanisms that generate such upheavals have been analyzed, which has made 
it possible to develop a mathematical model of the respective processes.  
The forecast of political instability in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2015–
2050 produced on the basis of this model is presented. 
Keywords: modernization, instability, Malthusian trap, mathematical model-
ing, youth bulge, urbanization, Africa, demographic dynamics, demographic 
transition, political dynamics, political demography.  
Malthusian Trap as a Factor of Political Instability  
What is that trap which we mention in the title of this article (and at whose es-
cape we claim another trap to be detected)? It is the so-called ‘Malthusian trap’. 
The Malthusian trap2 is a rather typical for pre-industrial societies situation 
when the growth of output (as it is accompanied by a faster demographic 
growth) does not lead in the long-range perspective to the increase in per capita 
                                                          
* This research has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No 14-11-00634). 
1 This is a modified and extended version of the article originally published in Cliodynamics (A Trap 
at the Escape from the Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in Modern Af-
rica and West Asia. Cliodynamics 2(2) (2011): 1–28. URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 
79t737gt). 
2 Using the terminology of non-linear dynamics one can also denote it as the low-level equilibrium 
attractor (cf. Nelson 1956). 
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output and the improvement of living conditions of the majority of population 
that remains close to the bare survival level (see, e.g., Malthus 1798, 1978 
[1798]; Artzrouni and Komlos 1985; Steinmann and Komlos 1988; Komlos and 
Artzrouni 1990; Steinmann, Prskawetz, and Feichtinger 1998; Wood 1998; 
Kögel and Prskawetz 2001; Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2008; Grinin and 
Korotayev 2009; Grinin et al. 2009; Grinin 2010).  
In complex pre-industrial societies the Malthusian trap was one of the main 
generators of state breakdowns (see, e.g., Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006; 
Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b; Chu and Lee 1994; Nefedov 2004; 
Turchin 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Turchin and Nefe-
dov 2009; Usher 1989; Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Grinin, Korotayev, and 
Malkov 2008; Grinin et al. 2009; Grinin 2007; Korotayev 2006; Korotayev, 
Komorova, and Khaltourina 2007; Kulpin 1990; Malkov 2002, 2003, 2004; 
S. Malkov and А. Malkov 2000; S. Malkov, Kovalyov, and А. Malkov 2000; 
Malkov et al. 2002; Malkov, Selunskaya, and Sergeyev 2005; Malkov and Ser-
geyev 2002, 2004а, 2004b; Mugruzin 1986, 1994; Nefedov 1999–2010; Nefe-
dov and Turchin 2007; Turchin 2007; van Kessel-Hagesteijn 2009).  
A typical example is provided by the last (Qing) of the ‘secular’ (see Koro-
tayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b; Turchin and Nefedov 2009) cycles of 
Chinese political-demographic dynamics. In 1700–1850 China managed to 
achieve rather impressive economic results (due to, say, introduction of some 
New World crops [first of all, maize and sweet potatoes], development of new 
varieties of previously known cultivated plants, agricultural labor intensifica-
tion, land reclamation, etc. [Ho 1955; 1959: 173–174, 180, 185–189; Lee 1982; 
Bray 1984: 452, 601; Perkins 1969: 39–40; Dikarev 1991: 69–70; Fairbank 
1992: 169; Lavely and Wong 1998: 725–726; Lee and Wang 1999: 37–40; 
Mote 1999: 750, 942; Nefedov 2000a: 17; Myers and Wang 2002: 599, 634–
636; Rowe 2002: 479; Zelin 2002: 216–218; van Kessel-Hagesteijn 2009]). As 
a result of these innovations the carrying capacity of land during this cycle was 
raised to a radically new level, which also resulted in a rather significant 
growth of the Chinese GDP.  
Thus, according to Maddison's (2001, 2010) estimations, between 1700 
and 1850 the GDP of China grew almost threefold (see Fig. 1).  
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Fig. 1. Economic macrodynamics of China, 1700–1850 (GDP, millions 
of 1990 international dollars, purchasing power parities)  
Data source: Maddison 2001, 2010.  
However, the Chinese population grew during the same period of time more 
than fourfold (see Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2. Population of China, millions, 1700–1850  
Note: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 539–540).  
As a result, by 1850 we observe a rather significant decline of per capita GDP 
(see Fig. 3).  
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Fig. 3. Relative dynamics of GDP, population, and per capita GDP in 
Qing China, 1700–1850 (100 = 1700 level)  
The decline in the level of life of the majority of Chinese (mainly resultant just 
from the point that the Chinese population growth rates exceeded the rates of 
economic growth) can be traced on the basis of a significant number of inde-
pendent data series. For example, Fig. 4 reflects the dynamics of average real 
daily wages of unskilled workers in this country. As we see, quite predictably, 
as a result of population growth rates being higher than GDP growth rates, the 
average real daily wages (that were not high at all even at the beginning of the 
respective period [see Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006 for comparisons]) 
dropped to the level of bare physiological survival by the end of the period in 
question.  
Population growth rate being higher than the growth rate of GDP, Qing 
China experienced a catastrophic decline in the level of life of the majority of 
Chinese population, which is confirmed by the data of Chinese genealogies 
(chia-p'u) (see Fig. 5).  
It worth stressing that in this case we are dealing with a really mass source 
(for example, Fig. 5 was compiled on the basis of several hundred thousand 
Chinese genealogies). It also appears necessary to take into account the point 
that representatives of really low class strata had rather poor chances to get into 
the abovementioned genealogies. Thus, the data in Fig. 5 reflects the dynamics 
of the level of life not of the real low class strata, but rather of the Qing ‘middle 
classes’, whose members were represented in these genealogies on a really 
mass scale.  
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Fig. 4. Population and food consumption in China in the Qing period  
Note: - - - ▄ - - – consumption (daily wages, liters of rice);  
––♦–– – population (millions).  
Source: Adopted from Nefedov 2003: 5. The data on daily wages are from Chao 1986: 
218–219. The data on population are from Zhao and Xie 1988: 541–542. 
 
Fig. 5.  Regional life expectancy from 1500 to 1800  
Note: ‘The figures indicate the average age at death of the population already having 
reached the Chinese age of 15’ (Heijdra 1998: 437); hence, the present diagram 
does not take into account those numerous representatives of respective popula-
tions who died before reaching this age. It is perfectly clear that, if this part of the 
population were taken into account, the values of the average age at death would 
be radically lower. However, the present diagram gives important information on 
the relative dynamics of this very important indicator.  
Source: Heijdra 1998: 437, fig. 9.3. 
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As we see, at the beginning of the Qing cycle the average age at death among 
the middle strata of the Chinese population was rather high – 55–60 years; 
however, by the end of the period in question the value of the respective indica-
tor falls to explicitly low values (around 45 years), whereas it seems appropri-
ate to emphasize that we are not dealing here with the lowest strata of the Chi-
nese population. Another impressive feature is a striking synchronicity of the 
decline of the average age at death in various regions of China in the course of 
the Qing sociodemographic cycle.  
The fact that the excess of demographic growth rates over GDP growth 
rates led in Qing China to a catastrophic decline in the level of life of the ma-
jority of population is confirmed by the data on dynamics of female infanticide 
(see Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6. Crude birth rates in Daoyi, 1774–1864 (per 1,000 married 
women aged 15–45)  
Source: Lee, Campbell, and Tan 1992: 164, fig. 5.5. 
Fig. 6 displays the results of processing of data taken from one of the Qing reg-
istration offices that registered births of both boys and girls. As we see, even in 
the beginning of the period covered by Fig. 6 the situation was far from prob-
lem-free – the office used to register just about 5 new-born girls per 10 new-
born boys. However, by the late 1840s the situation became simply catastro-
phic – the office tended to register 1–2 new-born girls per 10 new-born boys.  
It appears necessary to note that the historical economic research in this 
field has revealed for the Qing China the presence of rather strong and significant 
correlations between the levels of prices of basic food commodities and the  
levels of female infanticide (see, e.g., Lee, Campbell, and Tan 1992: 158–175).  
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This, of course, suggests that the catastrophic growth of female infanticide was 
connected with the catastrophic decline of the living standard of the Chinese 
population majority.3  
The catastrophic decline of the majority's level of life in China quite natu-
rally led to the growth of dissatisfaction with the government, which in 1850–
1870 produced a series of rebellions (the Taiping Rebellion was the largest 
among them [see, e.g., Ilyushechkin 1967; Larin 1986; Nepomnin 2005: 395–
444; Perkins 1969: 204; Kuhn 1978; Liu 1978 etc.]); this was apparently the 
bloodiest internal political collapse in the history of the humankind with  
the total number of dead being estimated as high as 118 (one hundred and 
eighteen!) million people (Huang 2002: 528). It worth noting that the majority 
of them died not as a result of direct violence, but because of diseases, famine, 
floods, etc. that took place in direct connection with the abovementioned 
events. The most destructive results were produced by the break of the dams by 
the Yellow River in 1853. As a result the great Chinese river changed its course 
(before these events it flew to the ocean south of the Shandung Peninsular, and 
afterwards it began to flow north of it), and a large part of densely populated 
Northern China was literally washed down. Numerous people died directly as 
a result of the flood, still more were left without sustenance, had to fled to the 
cities where the Qing government totally exhausted by the Taiping War had no 
resources to provide them with food. As a result, millions of undernourished 
people died of diseases and famine (see, e.g., Kuhn 1978 for more details).  
It should be emphasized that even the catastrophic change of the Yellow 
River course had evident Malthusian causes. The point is that in the preceding 
period the growing relative overpopulation of the Yellow River valley led to 
the increasing cultivation of the marginal lands upstream. This resulted in the 
acceleration of soil erosion and, consequently, the increasing silting of the Yel-
low River bottom; the bottom was rising more and more that increasingly 
raised the threat of floods. A whole system of counter-flood dams was built in 
order to counteract this threat – naturally, their height grew with the rise of the 
Yellow River bottom. As a result, by the beginning of the Taiping Rebellion  
the great Chinese river flew in its lower course well above the level of the North 
Chinese Plain, and in order to prevent its breaking the dams enormous (and con-
stantly growing) resources were needed. After the Taiping rebels4 captured  
the Chinese ‘breadbasket’ in the Lower Yangtze region, the revenues of the Qing 
budget shrank in the most catastrophic way; this was accompanied by an impetu-
ous increase in military expenses that were necessary to counteract the deadly 
Taiping onslaught. As a result, the Qing government failed to secure the neces-
                                                          
3 This was already noticed, for example, by Mann: ‘The … decline in population growth during the 
nineteenth century owed much to a rise in female infanticide, itself a direct response to declining 
economic opportunity’ (Mann 2002: 451).  
4 Note that the colossal sweep of their rebellion was determined up to a very significant degree just by 
Malthusian factors.   
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sary (and very costly) support of the extremely complex counter-flood system, 
and the catastrophic break of the dams by the Yellow River became inevitable 
(see Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b: ch. 2 for more details).  
Note that Malthus himself considered warfare (including, naturally, inter-
nal warfare) as one of the most important results of overpopulation (in addition 
to epidemics and famines). What is more, he regarded wars, epidemics, and 
famines (and all of these were observed in China in 1850–1870) as so-called 
‘positive checks’ that checked overpopulation in pre-industrial systems (Mal-
thus 1978 [1798]). Thus, in pre-industrial societies bloody political upheavals 
frequently turned out to be a result of the respective social systems being 
caught in the Malthusian trap.  
By now the students of social systems entrapped in the Malthusian trap 
have a rather significant number of mathematical models of political-
demographic dynamics of such social systems describing the development of 
bloody political upheavals at the phase of socio-demographic collapse of pre-
industrial political-demographic cycles (see, e.g., Korotayev and Khaltourina 
2006; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b; Usher 1989; Chu and Lee 
1994; Malkov 2009; Komlos and Nefedov 2002; Turchin 2003, 2005a, 2005b; 
Nefedov 2004; Turchin and Nefedov 2009; Turchin and Korotayev 2006 etc.).   
Demographic transition and the increase in agricultural productivity due to 
major technological advances in the recent centuries (see, e.g., Grinin 2006) 
allowed most states to escape the Malthusian trap. The first phase of the demo-
graphic transition is characterized by a decline in mortality due to improved 
nutrition, sanitation, advancement and spread of modern medical technologies, 
etc. This leads to the acceleration of population growth. In the second phase of 
demographic transition, the development of medicine in combination with other 
processes (especially with mass education among women) leads to a wide-
spread use of family planning technologies and, as a result, to a decrease of 
population growth rates (see, e.g., Chesnais 1992; Korotayev, Malkov, and 
Khaltourina 2006a).  
However, these modernization processes started later in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica than in the rest of the world; and even in the recent decades the Malthusian 
trap tended to produce state breakdowns in this region.   
For example, in the period preceding the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam's 
regime, from 1981 to 1991, Ethiopia's GDP grew by 12.5 %, but during the 
same period the population grew by 40 %. As a result, GDP per capita fell from 
very low $608 to catastrophic $500. Another dramatic fall occurred in per cap-
ita calorie intake: 1831 kcal/day in 1981 was already very low, 1657 in 1991 
was below physiological minimum (see Table 1).  
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Table 1. Ethiopian economic-demographic dynamics, 1981–1991  
Economic growth 1: 
total GDP production 
Demographic 
growth: population
Economic growth 2:
per capita GDP 
Per capita 
calorie 
intake Year 
international 
dollars 2005, 
PPP, blns 
% of 
1981 
level 
mlns 
% of 
1981 
level 
international
dollars 2005
% of 
1981 
level 
kcal per 
person 
per day 
1981 21.76 100 35.8 100 607.85 100 1831 
1986 22.50 103.4 42.1 117.6 534.24 87.9 1711 
1991 24.47 112.5 49.7 138.7 492.85 81.1 1657 
Sources: World Bank 2014; FAO 2014.  
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Fig. 7. Ethiopian economic-demographic dynamics, 1981–1991  
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Fig. 8. Per capita food consumption, Ethiopia, 1981–1991, kcal/day  
Such a low level of per capita food consumption means that a large part of 
a country's population is on the edge of serious starvation. In this situation, 
many inhabitants of this country might choose joining rebels (or bandits; in 
fact, as it is well known that rebels could be quite easily transformed into ban-
dits, and vice versa). It can be quite a rational choice when continuation of usu-
al ways of obtaining subsistence means an almost unavoidable hungry death, 
whereas joining rebels/bandits gives at least some realistic survival chances 
(see Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006 for more details). We do not say that this 
was the only cause of the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime, but we be-
lieve that this factor definitely contributed to this fall.  
Some Features of Political-Demographic  
Dynamics of Modernizing Systems  
Against this background it appears interesting to consider a few cases of major 
political upheavals in recent decades.  
Albania – Sociopolitical Collapse of 1997  
In 1997 Albania was swept by a wave of violent riots caused by the collapse of 
financial pyramids, as a result of which hundreds thousand Albanians lost all 
their savings. As is well known, many postsocialist European countries con-
fronted this sort of problem (like the famous collapse of the MMM pyramid in 
Russia), but nowhere did this lead to a sociopolitical collapse comparable with 
the Albanian one:  
By early March 1997, Albania was in chaos… The army and police had 
mostly deserted. Armories had been looted…, evacuation of foreign na-
tionals and mass emigration of Albanians to Italy began. The govern-
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ment's authority… had evaporated. When Tirana fell into civil disorder 
in late March, the government resigned… Some 2,000 people were 
killed… Almost one million weapons were looted… Large parts of the 
country were… outside of the government's control (Jarvis 1999: 18).  
The order in the country was only restored after the deployment of foreign (first 
of all, Italian) troops (Ibid.: 17). With a view to what we have already consid-
ered in the previous section, it appears rather seductive to suppose a certain 
‘Malthusian’ component in the above-described events. Indeed, in the 1960s – 
1990s Albania was the poorest European country with anomalously high (by 
European standards) birth and fertility rates (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2010). 
Within such a context there seem to be all the possible grounds to expect the 
development of a classical Malthusian scenario: population growing faster than 
output – decline of per capita food consumption to the level of bare survival (or 
even below) – social explosion.  
Against this background it appears interesting to consider the actual dy-
namics of per capita food consumption in Albania in the three decades preced-
ing the sociopolitical collapse of 1997 (see Fig. 9). 
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Fig. 9. Per capita food consumption in Albania, 1961–1996, kcal/day 
Data source: FAO 2014.  
As we see, for the period in question the dynamics of this indicator in Albania 
turned out to be almost contrary to the ones predicted by the Malthusian scenario. 
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Still in the early 1960s in Albania the problem of malnutrition was very serious 
and the average per capita food consumption was below the norm of 2300–
2400 kcal/day recommended by the WHO (see, e.g., Naiken 2002). 
However, in the 1960s and 1970s Albania managed to achieve evident suc-
cesses in the solution of the food problem; in the late 1960s – early 1970s in 
this country the per capita food consumption exceeded the norm recommended 
by the WHO – and afterwards it has never dropped below it. In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s the growth rate of this indicator slowed down, and in 1983–
1991 a certain trend towards its decline was observed, which, of course, reflects 
very serious economic difficulties that were experienced by Albania in the last 
years of the ‘communist’ period of its history (see, e.g., Sandstrom and Sjöberg 
1991). However, even in 1991 (the hardest year in Albania) per capita food 
consumption did not drop below the norm recommended by the WHO. On the 
other hand, after 1991 Albania managed to achieve new successes in solving 
the food problem, and in 1993–1996 per capita food consumption in Albania 
reached record values for the whole Albanian history; by 1997 it was closer to 
what would be more appropriately called ‘overeating’ rather than ‘undernour-
ishment’ level.  
In any case, we may maintain with a high degree of confidence that with 
respect to Albania in 1961–1997 it appear impossible to speak about anything 
like a drop of per capita food consumption to the level of bare survival as  
a result of the population growing faster than output. It appears much more 
appropriate to say that these were precisely those years when Albania managed 
to escape quite successfully from the Malthusian trap.5  
South Korea – The 1980 Kwangju Uprising  
After the end of the Korean War the largest popular uprising in South Korea 
took place in 1980 in the city of Kwangju (with 300 thousand participants, 
about 2000 dead, 5 divisions of regular army taking part in the suppression of 
the rebellion, etc.). This uprising was accompanied by a series of popular riots 
in neighboring cities (Lewis 2002).  
Against this background, the dynamics of per capita food consumption in 
South Korea in the two decades preceding the abovementioned popular rebel-
lion looks rather noteworthy (see Fig. 10).  
                                                          
5 Naturally, the 1997 sociopolitical collapse led to a certain decline in the average per capita food 
consumption (below 2700 kcal per day), which was still above the level recommended by the WHO; 
whereas later the growth of this indicator resumed (FAO 2014).  
Andrey V. Korotayev, Sergey Yu. Malkov, and Leonid E. Grinin 213 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Pe
r c
ap
ita
 fo
od
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(k
ca
l p
er
 d
ay
)
  
Fig. 10. Per capita food consumption in South Korea, 1961–1980, 
kcal/day 
As we see, South Korea was another country that in the early 1960s encoun-
tered the undernourishment problem, the average per capita food consumption 
being below the norm recommended by the WHO. On the other hand, this was 
another country that in the 1960s and the early 1970s managed to achieve very 
noticeable achievements in solving the food problem; note that these achieve-
ments were even more considerable than in Albania, it was already in the mid-
1960s that the average per capita food consumption in this country exceeded 
the norm recommended by the WHO (and it has never gone below that level 
afterwards). After 1973 the growth rate of this indicator in South Korea de-
creased, and in the late 1970s its certain (though quite insignificant) decline 
was observed. It does not seem to be a coincidence that this occurred simulta-
neously with the start of the period of an especially rapid growth of the South 
Korean economy (the so-called ‘Korean economic miracle’) when an unusually 
high proportion of the South Korean GDP was used for the gross capital forma-
tion purposes (see, e.g., Akaev 2010); hence, an unusually low GDP share was 
left for the consumption purposes. In the meantime, it appears necessary to 
stress that, notwithstanding some (incidentally, very small) decline of the per 
capita food consumption in the late 1970s, the value of this indicator remained 
at a very high (about 3000 kcal per day) level by the start of the abovemen-
tioned popular rebellion.  
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In any case, with respect to South Korea in 1961–1980 we again get across 
the case when it is impossible to note any fall of per capita food consumption to 
the level of bare survival as a result of the population growth rates exceeding 
the output growth rates. We rather get across one more case when a social sys-
tem escaped rather successfully from the Malthusian trap just in the decades 
preceding a social explosion. 
Egypt – 1977 ‘Bread Riots’ 
The largest political unrest in Egypt after 1952 took place in 1977 (the so-called 
‘Bread Riots’). The participants were chanting  
 
Yā batl al-`ubūr! Fēn al-futūr?‘Hero of the Crossing, where is our breakfast?’ 
(addressing President Sadat). 
The riots took place in all the large Egyptian cities, several hundred thousand 
people participated in them, not less than 800 fell victim (see, e.g., Hirst 1977). 
Seemingly, we should deal here with nothing else than Malthusian scenario, as 
the protesters clearly complained about food insufficiency, while in the 1960s – 
1970s the Egyptian population was growing exceedingly fast (see Fig. 11).   
 
Fig. 11. Egyptian population dynamics, thousands of people, 1836–
1989  
Data sources: for 1950–2005: Maddison 2001, 2010; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010; 
World Bank 2014; for 1897–1950: Craig 1917; Cleveland 1936: 7; 
Nāmiq 1952; McCarthy 1976: 31–3; Vasilyev 1990: 205; for 1800–1897: 
Panzac's (1987) estimates.  
In this regard it seems reasonable to view the actual dynamics of per capita 
food consumption in Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s (see Fig. 12).  
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Fig. 12. Per capita food consumption in Egypt, 1961–1982, kcal/day 
Source: FAO 2014.  
Evidently, Malthusian scenario does not work here. Indeed, in the early 1960s 
the problem of undernourishment was still quite acute for Egypt, and per capita 
consumption was lower than the WHO recommended norm of 2300– 
2400 kcal/person/day (Naiken 2002). In the mid-1960s Egypt reached this lev-
el, but could not exceed it before 1974. After 1973 per capita food consumption 
increased rapidly, getting over 3000 kcal/day in 1982 (next year after Sadat's 
death) and never after decreasing beyond this level. Thus, the problem of over-
eating became more relevant for Egypt than the one of undernourishment. This 
success should be attributed to the Infitah economic reforms launched by Sadat 
administration in 1974 (see, e.g., Weinbaum 1985: 215–216). Indeed, though 
population grew by 36.1 % from 1970 to 1982, Egyptian GDP grew by 141.1 % 
during the same period, the major part of this growth taking place during In-
fitah. As a result, GDP per capita grew almost twofold, which correlated with 
the similarly rapid growth in per capita consumption (see Table 2 and Fig. 13).  
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Table 2. Egyptian economic-demographic dynamics in the ‘Sadat epoch’ 
(1970–1982)  
Year Economic growth 1: GDP production 
Demographic 
growth: population
Economic growth 2: GDP 
per capita production 
Per capita 
food con-
sumption 
 
Bln interna-
tional dol-
lars 1990, 
PPP 
% from 
1970 level 
Millions 
of people
% from 
1970 level
Interna-
tional dol-
lars 1990 
% from 1970 
level 
Kcal/person/ 
day 
1970 42.1 100.0 33.6 100.0 1 254 100.0 2355 
1971 43.9 104.2 34.2 101.8 1 283 102.3 2341 
1972 44.7 106.1 34.8 103.7 1 284 102.4 2361 
1973 45.9 109.1 35.5 105.7 1 294 103.2 2376 
1974 47.7 113.2 36.2 107.9 1 317 105.0 2443 
1975 52.5 124.7 37.0 110.1 1 421 113.3 2481 
1976 60.6 144.0 37.7 112.4 1 606 128.1 2555 
1977 68.5 162.8 38.8 115.5 1 767 140.9 2600 
1978 73.8 175.3 40.0 119.2 1 844 147.0 2702 
1979 79.6 189.1 41.3 122.9 1 930 153.9 2811 
1980 88.2 209.5 42.6 127.0 2 069 165.0 2887 
1981 91.7 217.9 44.2 131.6 2 076 165.5 2992 
1982 101.5 241.1 45.7 136.1 2 223 177.2 3067 
Data source: Maddison 2001, 2010; FAO 2014.  
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Fig. 13. Egyptian economic-demographic dynamics in the ‘Sadat epoch’ 
(1970–1982) 
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Thus, ‘bread riots’ occurred in Egypt at that very time when the country was 
successfully escaping from the Malthusian trap.  
Syria – The 1982 Hama Rebellion  
In Syria after the end of the Second World War the largest popular rebellion 
took place in 1982 in Hama. The rebellion was suppressed with regular army 
units, aviation, artillery, and tanks. According to some estimates, the number of 
dead reached 40 thousand, including 1000 soldiers of regular army (see, e.g., 
Fisk 1990; Friedman 1998; Wiedl 2006).  
After the cases considered above the picture of dynamics of per capita food 
consumption in Syria in the two decades preceding the Hama rebellion should 
not look surprising. Yet, with respect to this country the ‘counter-Malthusian’ 
dynamics looks especially impressive – indeed, in the nine years preceding the 
rebellion the per capita food consumption in Syria was growing continuously 
and very rapidly (see Fig. 14).  
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Fig. 14. Per capita food consumption in Syria, 1961–1982, kcal/day  
Source: FAO 2014. 
In general, as we see, in the two decades preceding the largest popular rebellion 
in its post-war history Syria had escaped the Malthusian trap in a rather suc-
cessful way, having moved within a historically very short period quite far from 
the level of explicit undernourishment of the early 1960s and reaching by 1982 
a level that could be more accurately characterized as overeating.   
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Civil War in El Salvador  
In 1980 a civil war began in El Salvador; it continued till 1992 and led to the 
death of 75 thousand inhabitants of this country – a colossal number for a coun-
try with total population of about 4.5 mln people at the moment of the civil war 
start (see, e.g., Montgomery 1995).  
In the meantime, the per capita food consumption dynamics in El Salvador 
looked as follows (see Fig. 15):  
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Fig. 15. Per capita food consumption in El Salvador, 1961–1992, 
kcal/day  
Source: FAO 2014.  
We obviously see here a picture that is generally similar to the cases observed 
above; however, it has some noticeable nuances. As we see, still in the early 
1960s the majority of the Salvadorian population confronted the most serious 
(in comparison with all the other cases considered above) undernourishment 
problems. The situation with food consumption somehow improved in this 
country in the 1960s. However, it improved in the most significant way just in 
the decade that preceded directly the outbreak of the Salvadorian civil war. It 
was just the year of the civil war start when per capita food consumption in this 
country reached the level recommended by the World Health Organization.  
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Civil War in Liberia  
In 1989 a civil war started in Liberia which continued up to 2003. About 
200,000 – 300,000 Liberians were killed (of the total population slightly more 
than 2 mln at the war start) (Frenkel 1999; Huband 1998; Williams 2006). Gen-
eral dynamics of per capita food consumption in Liberia during 3 decades pre-
ceding the civil war looked as follows (see Fig. 16): 
 
Fig. 16.  Per capita food consumption, Liberia, 1961–1989, kcal/day 
Source: FAO 2014. 
Thus, in the 1960s – 1980s (before civil war) per capita food consumption 
tended to grow in Liberia. While in the early 1960s there was some undernour-
ishment, in the 1980s per capita consumption was thoroughly higher than the 
recommended norm of 2300–2400 kcal/day. Besides, in the year of civil war 
start Liberia occupied the FIRST place in Tropical Africa according to the level 
of per capita food consumption (see Fig. 17).  
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Fig. 17. Average per capita food consumption (kcal/day) in various 
countries of Tropical Africa in 1989 (i.e., in the year of the 
Liberian civil war start)  
Source: FAO 2014. 
 
Liberian case is among the most tragic ones, as not only did the country ‘stum-
ble’ at the escape from the Malthusian trap, but also fell back into the trap again 
(see Fig. 18). 
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Fig. 18. Per capita food consumption in Liberia, 1984–2005, kcal/day 
Source: FAO 2014.  
Thus, in 2005 per capita food consumption had not yet approached the pre-war 
level and was significantly lower than even the early 1960s level. After civil 
war started, an unfavorable mechanism of positive feedback formed in Liberia, 
as civil war destroyed economy, which reduced the per capita consumption, 
which increased the unrest and worsened the civil war. During the short breaks 
the renewed (even before economy restoration) rapid demographic growth did 
not allow for any remarkable improvement in living standards (nor in per capita 
consumption) or even led to its worsening, which resulted in new unrests and 
new stages of civil war. Currently Liberia is again trying to escape from the 
Malthusian trap, but there is no warranty against its getting into ‘a trap at 
the escape from the Malthusian trap’ once more.  
Civil War in Côte d'Ivoire  
One of the most recent civil wars in Africa occurred in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 
(Akokpari 2007). Per capita food consumption dynamics thereby looked as 
follows (see Fig. 19):  
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Fig. 19. Per capita food consumption, Côte d'Ivoire, 1961–2003, 
kcal/day 
Source: FAO 2014. 
Thus, undernourishment problem was solved in the 1960s, and at the civil war 
start per capita food consumption was stably higher than the WHO recom-
mended norm. Besides, in the civil war start year Côte d'Ivoire rated among the 
top Tropical African countries according to per capita food consumption indi-
cator (see Fig. 20). 
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Fig. 20. Average per capita food consumption (kcal/day) in various 
countries of Tropical Africa in 2002 (i.e., in the year of the 
civil war start in Côte d'Ivoire) 
Source: FAO 2014. 
Islamic Revolution in Iran  
Against the background of the material considered above the dynamics of per 
capita food consumption in Iran in the years preceding the successful Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 in Iran should not look really surprising (see Fig. 21).  
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Fig. 21. Per capita food consumption in Iran, 1961–1979, kcal/day  
Source: FAO 2014.  
This diagram suggests that the system of socioeconomic reforms (the so-called 
‘White Revolution’ [see, e.g., Abrahamian 2008: 123–154]) started by the last 
Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1963 brought conspicuous positive 
results. Indeed, the Iranian population grew very rapidly in the years preceding 
the Iranian Revolution. For example, between 1965 and 1979 it grew from 25 
to almost 38 million (see, e.g., Maddison 2001, 2010), that is by about 50 %. 
However, in the same period of time the agricultural output in Iran grew by 
more than 100 % (see Fig. 22).  
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Fig. 22. Dynamics of agricultural output in Iran, 1965–1979 (in mil-
lions of constant 2000 dollars)  
Source: World Bank 2014.  
In the meantime Iranian GDP in this period grew by more than 150 %, as a re-
sult of which per capita GDP increased by 75 % (Maddison 2001; 2010). 
Hence, the salient positive trend of per capita food consumption dynamics in 
Iran reflects up to a rather high degree the real economic successes that were 
achieved by this country as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's administration was im-
plementing the system of socioeconomic reforms known as the ‘White Revolu-
tion’.  
Civil War in Algeria 
Let us consider in some greater detail the structural-demographic dynamics of 
Algeria 1962–1991, that is in the period after independence and before the start  
of the civil war (1992–2002) which can be characterized as a failed Islamic 
revolution (Kepel 2004: 164–180, 247–266). Per capita consumption dynamics 
in Algeria during the two decades preceding the civil war looked as follows 
(see Fig. 23):  
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Fig. 23. Per capita food consumption, Algeria, 1962–1991, kcal/day 
Sources: FAO 2014; Zinkina 2010: 260. 
Obviously, the dynamics observed is just contrary to the one that could be ex-
pected on the basis of the Malthusian trap assumption. Indeed, in the first years 
after independence the Algerian population was far below the WHO norm and 
greatly undernourished. Only in 1973 did it manage to go over the critical level of 
1850 kcal/day. However, there was no unrest in this period. By the late 1970s 
Algeria exceeded the WHO 2300–2400 kcal/day recommended level and did not 
fall below this level any more. By the late 1980s it was more than 2800 kcal/day. 
This dynamics correlates very well with the rapid growth of agricultural labor 
productivity proving the significant success achieved by Algeria in the moderniza-
tion of agriculture (see Fig. 24).  
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Fig. 24. Labor productivity in Algerian agriculture, 1962–1991 (con-
stant 2000 dollars per agricultural worker)  
Source: World Bank 2014.  
A Trap at the Escape from the Malthusian Trap: 
Empirical Data  
During the three decades preceding the start of the civil war Algeria success-
fully came out of the Malthusian trap; in fact, as we shall see below, this very 
escape to a large extent generated the forces that played a crucial role in the 
genesis of the Algerian civil war.  
By definition, the escape from the Malthusian trap implies the solution of 
the famine problem, which in its turn implies a significant decrease in the death 
rates. Indeed, for countries with per capita consumption up to 2900 kcal/day 
there is a strong negative correlation observed between this indicator and the 
crude death rate (see Fig. 25 and Table 3).  
A Trap at the Escape from the Trap? 228 
C
ru
de
 d
ea
th
 ra
te
, p
er
 th
ou
sa
nd
 
 
Per capita food consumption, kcal/day 
Fig. 25. Correlation between per capita food consumption and crude 
death rate (according to 1995 data for countries with con-
sumption up to 2900 kcal/day)  
Note: r = – 0,64, R2 = 0,41, p << 0,0001. Source: SPSS 2010.  
Table 3. Regression analysis 
 
 
Non-standardized 
coefficient  
Standardized 
coefficient  
Model B Stat. error β 
t Statistical significance (p) 
(Constant) 38 5.1  7.45 << 0.0001 
Per capita food 
consumption, 
kcal/day 
–0.012 0.002 –0.639 –5.45 << 0.0001 
Dependent variable:  Crude death rate (per 1000)  
As escape from the Malthusian trap usually occurs at the first stage of demographic 
transition, the results of regression analysis imply that this escape (usually accom-
panied by more than 1000 kcal/day growth in per capita consumption) must be ac-
companied by population growth rates increase by not less than one per cent, which 
implies a very significant acceleration. This can be seen in Algeria. The escape 
from the Malthusian trap was accompanied by a dramatic fall in death rate (see 
Fig. 26).  
Andrey V. Korotayev, Sergey Yu. Malkov, and Leonid E. Grinin 229 
 
Fig. 26. Crude death rate (per 1000) dynamics in Algeria, 1960–1992  
Source: World Bank 2014.  
Thus, in three decades preceding the start of the civil war the Algerian death 
rates declined threefold! During the most of this period birth rate was stably 
high, so population growth rates were increasing and started to decline only in 
the mid-1980s, but in 1991 (civil war start) they were still very high (2.4 % or 
600,000 a year) (see Figs 27 and 28).   
 
Fig. 27. Relative population growth rates, Algeria, 1970–1983,  
% a year 
Source: Maddison 2001, 2010.  
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Fig. 28. Absolute population growth rates, Algeria, 1970–1985, thou-
sands per year 
Source: Maddison 2001, 2010.  
Naturally, such an impetuous population growth would almost inevitably create 
serious structural strains in any social system. However, within the Algerian 
social system this was not the only generator of structural strains.  
Within socioeconomic systems escaping from the Malthusian trap per capita 
consumption growth correlates in an especially strong way with the decrease of 
infant and child mortality (see Figs 29 and 30):  
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Fig. 29. Correlation between per capita food consumption and infant 
mortality rate (per 1000 live births) according to 1995 data, 
for countries with less than 2900 kcal/day  
Note: r = – 0.69, R2 = 0.475, p << 0.0001 (for interval < 2700 kcal the value of r 
achieves – 0.74).  
Source: SPSS 2010.  
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 Per capita food consumption, kcal/day 
Fig. 30. Correlation between per capita food consumption and (under-
five) child mortality rate (per 1000) according to 1995, data 
for countries with less than 2900 kcal/day) 
Note: r = – 0.68, R2 = 0.46, p << 0,0001 (for interval < 3000 kcal value of r achieves  
– 0.7).  
Source: SPSS 2010.  
Predictably, Algerian escape from the Malthusian trap was also accompanied 
by a precipitous fall of infant and child mortality rates (Figs 31 and 32):    
 
Fig. 31. Infant mortality, Algeria, 1960–1995, per 1000 live births  
Source: World Bank 2014.  
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Fig. 32. Under-five mortality, Algeria, 1960–1995, per 1000  
Source: World Bank 2014. 
Thus, while crude death rate in Algeria in 1960–1995 decreased threefold, infant 
mortality declined almost fourfold during the same period, while child (under-
five) mortality fell almost fivefold!  
Thus, at the first phase of demographic transition (that tends to coincide 
with the escape from the Malthusian trap) death rate declines dramatically 
(Vishnevski 1976, 2005; Chesnais 1992; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 
2006a), the greatest decline occurring in infant and under-five mortality, while 
birth rates still remain high. Thus, out of six-seven children born by a woman, 
five-six children survive up to reproductive age, not two or three as earlier. This 
leads not only to the demographic explosion, but also to the formation of the 
‘youth bulge’, as the generation of children turns out to be much larger in 
number than their parents' generation. Thus, in Algeria the share of youth 
cohort in the total population greatly increased at the escape from the Malthusian 
trap (see Fig. 33).  
 
Fig. 33. Youth cohort (aged 15–24) in the population of Algeria, 1970–
2005, with a forecast up to 2015, %  
Source: UN Population Division 2010.  
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A number of researchers, first of all Goldstone (1991, 2002), regard the rapid 
growth of the youth share in population as a major factor of political instability.  
For example, Goldstone maintains that ‘the rapid growth of youth can un-
dermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large youth cohorts are 
often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of 
authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities 
for families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or politi-
cal conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political violence through-
out recorded history, and the existence of a ‘youth bulge’ (an unusually high 
proportion of youths aged 15–24 years relative to the total adult population) has 
historically been associated with times of political crisis. Most major revolu-
tions … [including] most twentieth-century revolutions in developing coun-
tries – have occurred where exceptionally large youth bulges were present’ 
(Goldstone 2002: 10–11; see also Goldstone 1991; Moller 1968; Mesquida and 
Weiner 1999; Heinsohn 2003; Fuller 2004).  
Let us consider the ‘youth bulge’ factor in Algeria in more detail. This will 
allow specifying some other channels of this factor's impact upon the political 
instability genesis. First of all consider the dynamics of absolute number of 
young Algerians (see Fig. 34).  
 
Fig. 34. Dynamics of young (aged 15–24) Algerian population, thou-
sands, 1970–1995  
Source: UN Population Division 2010.  
Thus, number of Algerian youths was growing explosively at the eve of the civil 
war, more than doubling within 20 years (1970–1990). In 1980–1995 it grew by 
65 %. Accordingly, in order to prevent catastrophic unemployment, new 
workplaces had to be created at a proportionate rate, which is difficult even for 
a fast-growing economy. If an economy is not growing as fast, unemployment 
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rockets up (in Algeria it reached 40 % in the late 1980s: Haldane 1989; Zinkina 
2010: 261), especially among the youth (i.e., among that very age cohort which is 
most inclined to aggression). Against such a background it usually becomes more 
and more difficult to prevent major political upheavals.  
There is one more force generated by modernization in general (and the 
escape from the Malthusian trap, in particular) that can contribute to the genesis 
of political instability, namely urbanization (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 
2009; Grinin 2010). Indeed, the start of escape from the Malthusian trap leads to 
a stable decline in death rates, stipulating the first phase of demographic 
transition. The escape itself is achieved through agricultural labor productivity 
growth (as was mentioned above, in Algeria it grew fivefold during the two 
decades preceding the civil war).  
In general, the escape from the Malthusian trap stimulates urban population 
growth in several ways. Death rate decline in conjunction with still high birth 
rates leads to a rapid increase of population growth rates, so excessive rural 
population appears. This population is pressed out of the rural areas, as labor 
productivity grows, and less workforce is required for agricultural work. This 
population may well be supplied with food resources as per capita food produc-
tion and consumption increases at the escape from the Malthusian trap, so such 
escape strongly supports the rapid intensification of urbanization processes, 
allowing for the urbanization levels which could not be achieved in agrarian 
societies.  
Let us consider this with respect to the Algerian case (see Fig. 35). 
 
Fig. 35. Dynamics of urban population percentage in Algerian, 1970–
1990  
Source: UN Population Division 2010.  
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Thus, less than one-third of Algerians resided in cities at the eve of independ-
ence. At the eve of the civil war the urban population constituted more than 
a half of the whole population. This increase took place against the background 
of a very fast demographic growth. Thus, urban population was growing par-
ticularly fast in absolute numbers (see Fig. 36).  
 
Fig. 36. Total urban population of Algeria, 1970–1990, thousands 
Source: UN Population Division 2010.  
Thus, during 30 years preceding the civil war start in Algeria the urban popula-
tion grew fourfold, which evidently could serve as a major destabilizing factor.  
The escape from the Malthusian trap engenders a rapid growth of urban 
population due to both natural increase and rural-urban migrations. This causes 
social tensions, as jobs and accommodation need to be supplied for the fast-
growing mass of people. Besides, rural migrants usually have no skills appro-
priate for urban settings and can only find unqualified and low-paid jobs, which 
causes growing discontent among them.  
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of the rural-urban mi-
grants are usually young. The ‘youth bulge’ and intensive urbanization factors 
act together, making the number of young urban population rocket up.6 For 
example, during 30 years of independence in Algeria its young population grew 
almost threefold, while its urban population increased fourfold, so the number 
of the urban youth increased by an order of magnitude (which was just a logical 
consequence of the country's escape from the Malthusian trap). Thus, not only 
did the most radically inclined part of population rocket up in numbers, but it 
also got concentrated in cities (that, we should not forget, are centers of politi-
cal system), which is a serious danger for political stability, especially if eco-
nomic decline occurs.  
                                                          
6 Note that, as these are young males (rather than females) that tend to migrate from the rural to urban 
areas, we have an especially explosive growth of young male urban population, which has 
a particularly destabilizing effect.  
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It appears quite useful to consider the action of the above-described factors 
at the ‘grassroots’ level. For this we find it appropriate to reproduce Kepel's 
description of the events in Algeria that preceded the October riots of 1988, 
which served as an omen of the forthcoming civil war:  
…A population explosion had thrust the children of the fellahs (farmers) 
into the cities and their outskirts, where conditions were precarious… In 
1989, 40 percent of Algeria's population of 24 million were under 
15 years of age; the urban population was in excess of 50 percent of the 
total population… The official unemployment rate was 18.1 percent of 
the working population, though in reality joblessness was much higher; 
in 1995 it rose – again officially – to 28 percent. The young urban poor 
of Algeria were mocked as hittistes – from the Arab word hit, ‘wall’. 
This jibe derived from the image of jobless young men with nothing to 
do all day but lean against a wall. The joke was that, in a socialist coun-
try where in theory everyone was supposed to have a job, the profession 
of a hittiste consisted in propping up walls that would otherwise col-
lapse. The hittistes were assumed to be passive – unlike the Iranian ones, 
who were glorified by religious movements and hailed as the messengers 
of history and the Revelation.  
At the time of the October 1988 riots, oil and gas represented 
95 percent of the nation's exports and supplied more than 60 percent of 
the government's yearly budget… The Algerian state was a kind of pop-
ular democracy cum oil. The state used its oil revenues to buy social 
pacification… This balance of power, maintained by subsidies, social-
ism, repression, and official ideology, was ultimately dependent on the 
fragile economic equilibrium created by the high price of oil. In 1986, 
when oil prices collapsed, half of Algeria's budget was wiped out and the 
whole structure fell down in ruins. Worse, the population explosion had 
created a demand for… urban infrastructure, housing, and employment 
that continued to increase… The construction industry in particular had 
failed spectacularly to keep pace with the housing demand; the result 
was the kind of slums and overcrowded urban conditions that invariably 
lead to social eruption.  
It was in this deteriorating climate, punctuated by continual strikes, 
that riots broke out on October 4, 1988. Mobs of impoverished Algerian 
youths attacked such symbols of the state as buses, road signs, and Air 
Algeria agencies, along with any automobile that looked expensive… 
These days… marked the emergence of the young urban poor as a force 
to be reckoned with. The once ridiculed hittistes had shown that they 
could seize and hold power in the streets, shaking to its foundations a re-
gime that had excluded them and whose legitimacy they scorned (Kepel 
2006: 159–161).  
A Trap at the Escape from the Malthusian Trap:  
Logical and Mathematical Models  
Thus, the emergence of major sociopolitical upheavals at the escape from the 
Malthusian trap is not an abnormal, but a regular phenomenon. So, a special 
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explanation is rather needed for exceptions, when social systems managed to 
avoid such shocks.  
Why should such upheavals be treated as a regular phenomenon? The an-
swer may be summarized as follows:  
1) Start of the escape from the Malthusian trap tends to bring about a pre-
cipitous death rate decline and, consequently, an explosive acceleration of the 
population growth rates (which in itself can lead to a certain increase in socio-
political tensions).  
2) The start of the escape is accompanied by especially strong decreases in 
infant and under-five mortality, which raises the proportion of the youth in the 
overall population (and especially in the adult population) – the so-called 
‘youth bulge’.  
3) This increases sharply the proportion of the part of population most in-
clined to radicalism.  
4) The impetuous growth of the young population requires the creation of 
enormous numbers of new jobs, which is a serious economic problem, while 
the youth unemployment growth can have a particularly strong destabilizing 
effect, creating an ‘army’ of potential participants for various political upheav-
als, including civil wars, revolutions, and state breakdowns.  
5) Escape from the Malthusian trap stimulates a vigorous growth of the ur-
ban population. Besides, excessive population is pressed out from the country-
side by the growth of agricultural labor productivity. Massive rural-urban mi-
gration almost inevitably creates a significant number of those dissatisfied with 
their current position, as initially the rural-urban migrants mostly can only get 
unskilled low-paid jobs and low-quality accommodation.  
6) Escape from the Malthusian trap is achieved through the development of 
new economic sectors and decline of the old ones. Such structural changes can-
not proceed painlessly, as old qualification of workers loses its value and, not 
having necessary new skills, these workers are obliged to take up low-qualified 
jobs, which makes them socially discontent.  
7) The young people make up the majority of rural-urban migrants, so the 
‘youth bulge’ and intensive urbanization factors act together, producing a par-
ticularly strong destabilizing effect. Not only does the most radically inclined 
part of population rocket up in numbers, but it also gets concentrated in major 
cities / political centers.  
8) This can result in serious political destabilization even against the back-
ground of a rather stable economic growth (see Fig. 37). The probability of 
political destabilization naturally increases dramatically if an economic crisis 
occurs, or if the government loses its legitimacy due to any other causes (such 
as military defeats), though the recent ‘Arab Spring’ events have demonstrated 
once again in a rather salient way that even this is not really necessary (see, 
e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011).   
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As regards mathematical models describing the formation of the ‘youth bulge’ 
(that, in combination with some other factors, can lead to major sociopolitical 
upheavals even against the background of an apparently rather successful es-
cape from the Malthusian trap), they are rather well-developed and are widely 
used in demographic research.  
We can regard a model by Ototsky (2008) as an example. It uses component 
method (or cohort analysis) to describe mathematically the dynamics of society 
age structure. The method of components implies dividing the whole popula-
tion into groups of people of one age, so-called ‘year cohorts’, which are di-
vided into male and female ones for correct estimation of the population repro-
ductive potential. For each cohort their own birth, death, and migration rates are 
determined. Birth year of people subsumed under the cohort is regarded as  
a serial number of this cohort. Number of males (or females) in a cohort is ex-
pressed in the following way:  
kMmwMNmkUmNmNm it
i
tit
i
t
i
t   11 , ,it   (Eq. 1) 
where Nmit is a number of males in cohort i; kUmt – age-specific death rate; 
Mt – age-specific net immigration; kMmwt – share of males in net immigration; 
i – cohort serial number (corresponds to the year of people in the cohort); t – 
year of calculation; t-i – age of people in cohort i. 
 
Number of newborn boys (and girls) is calculated with the following equation:  
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where Nmit is a number of newborn boys; Nwt – number of women in age co-
horts; kR*t – age-specific birth rates according to cohorts of mothers; i – cohort 
number (accords to birth year of people in the cohort), for newborns i = t; kRmw t – 
share of boys in the newborn. 
 
Number of the newborn in an age group is calculated in the following way:  



i
i
n
lk
kNwkRR ** , (Eq. 3) 
where R* is number of the newborn in mothers' age group; kR* – age-specific 
birth rate of mothers' cohort; Nwk – number of women of age k; i – age group 
index (the maximum age in the group); il  – the minimum age in age group i; 
in  – the maximum age in age group i. 
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Fig. 37. ‘A trap at the escape from the Malthusian trap’. A cognitive 
model  
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General number of the newborn by mother cohorts is calculated with the fol-
lowing equation:  
.*
0



i
g
gi RR
 (Eq. 4) 
Distribution of age-specific death rates among yearly age cohorts of males and 
females is calculated through the interpolation of the integral of the number of 
dead according to age groups:  
,**
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ki NmkUmUm  (Eq. 5) 
where Um* is number of men who died within the age group; i – age group 
index (the maximum age in group); kUm* – age-specific male death rate by age 
group; Nmk – number of males of age k; il  – the minimum age in an age 
group; ni – the maximum age in age group.  
Integral of dead males by age cohorts: 
.*
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gi UmUm  (Eq. 6) 
The same way is used to calculate the number of dead females in age group 
(Uw*i) and integral number of dead females by cohorts (Uwi).  
Age-specific of male and female death rates by age cohorts are calculated as 
follows: 
i
i
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UwkUw   (Eq. 7) 
Detailed statistical data are needed for making calculations with the model (1)–
(7). If detailed data lack or approximate estimations suffice, the analytical 
McKendrick – von Foerster model can be used (McKendrick 1926; von Foer-
ster 1959). According to it, equations for defining the number of people of age τ 
at a moment of time t are written in the following form: 
),(),(),(),( tutdtu
t
tu 
 

 , 
),()0,(,),(),(5,0),0(
0
 gudtbtutu    
(Eq. 8) 
where u(τ,t) is the number of people of age τ at a moment of time t; b(τ,t) is the 
intensity of childbearing among females of age τ at a moment of time t; d(τ,t) is 
the age-specific death rate for people of age τ at moment of time t; g(τ) is the 
age structure of society at the starting moment of time (for simplicity it is im-
plied that the difference between numbers of males and females is negligibly 
small, and the number of born boys is equal to that of girls, the death rate d(τ,t) 
is the same for males and females). 
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Model (8) is capable of describing the emergence of ‘youth bulge’ in a soci-
ety escaping from the Malthusian trap.  
Assume that up to some moment of time t0 the society was demographically 
stable (its age structure did not change, see Fig. 38), while fertility rate was 
high (7 children per woman) and infant mortality was high, too.  
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Fig. 38. Initial age structure of the society (simulation)  
If at moment t0 infant mortality starts declining and decreases fivefold in 30 years, 
then according to Eq. 8 society age structure will substantially change with the 
unchanged structure of birth rate (see Fig. 39, lines correspond to successive 
change of the society demographic structure during 55 years from the t0 mo-
ment).  
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Fig. 39. Change of the age structure with the decrease of infant mor-
tality (simulation)  
Obviously, infant mortality decline leads to an increase in proportion of the 
youth within total population. Thereby a ‘youth bulge’ emerges (see Fig. 40 
reflecting the change of percentage of population aged 15–24 in the overall 
population starting from t0 + 20 years).  
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Fig. 40. Change of the youth (population aged 15–24) proportion in the 
total population with infant mortality decline (simulation)  
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Obviously, despite their simulation character the results of calculations corre-
late with the empirical data rather well (see Fig. 33 above).  
The excessive young population not required in the rural areas moves to cit-
ies searching for better life, which affects the development of socioeconomic 
and political processes in the society. The result of these processes depends on 
particular conditions. In any case, it is a critical period in the life of any society 
escaping from the Malthusian trap.  
Figs 41 and 42 represent the results of calculations on urban population 
growth and urban population percentage increase with an assumption that the 
increasing demographic pressure in rural areas presses the excessive population 
(and especially the young population) to move to the urban areas with probabil-
ity about 0.5 (calculations are presented for the same conditions as in Figs 38–
40 starting from t0 + 20 years). 
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Fig. 41. Urban population growth under the impact of migration  
inflow from rural areas (simulation)  
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Fig. 42. Increase in proportion of urban population under the impact 
of intensifying rural-urban migration (simulation)  
Naturally, mass rural-urban migration is possible only in conditions of general 
economic growth when some ‘surplus’ product appears which allows to feed 
the growing urban population. In order to account for this condition we can use 
the general dynamic urbanization equation developed in our earlier works (see, 
e.g., Korotayev 2006):  
),lim( uuaSudt
du   (Eq. 8) 
where u is the proportion of urban population (‘urbanization index’); S is per 
capita ‘surplus’; а is a constant; ulim is the maximum possible urban population 
proportion (which can be estimated as lying between 0.8–0.9 and in this context 
may be viewed as the ‘saturation level’; in calculations presented below this 
value was taken as 0.9).  
The sense of this equation is as follows: urbanization being low, the prob-
ability of a rural resident migrating to town is the higher, the greater urban 
population proportion. Indeed, the higher this proportion, the greater the prob-
ability of having some relative or acquaintance in town, who will be able to 
supply the rural migrant with the necessary information and initial support (an 
ordinary peasant will hardly decide to move ‘into nowhere’). However, urban 
population growth rates slow down when approaching the saturation level.  
Besides, both in our equation and in real life urbanization rates depend also 
on the level of economic development, which in our equation is calculated 
through the per capita surplus. Indeed, if rural areas do not produce surplus, 
urbanization becomes impossible, while in order for it to start (and accelerate) 
significant economic growth is required. It also requires the labor productivity 
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growth, for example, in agriculture, which would allow feeding the urban popu-
lation, on the one hand, and creating a surplus of workforce in agriculture en-
couraging the rural residents to move to cities, on the other.  
Uniting Eqs 1 and 8 into a system we obtain a mathematical description of 
the young urban population dynamics.  
Correlation between Young Urban Population Growth 
Rates and Intensity of Internal Violent Conflicts: A Cross-
National Test  
Our cross-national test indicates that violent internal conflicts should be ex-
pected in cases when the young urban population grows by more than 30 % 
during 5 years; if this indicator exceeds 45 % it turns out very difficult for cor-
responding countries to avoid such upheavals (see Table 4 and Figs 43–45):  
Table 4.  Correlation between the maximum growth rates of young 
urban population (% per five-year periods) and internal vio-
lent conflicts’ intensity, 1960–2005  
Internal violent conflict intensity 
 1 (low, < 500 
violent deaths) 
2 (medium  
and high, 500–
100 000) 
3 (very high  
> 100 000) 
8 1 0 (Very low, < 15 %)
88.9 % 11.1 % 
0 
3 2 1 (Low, 15–20 %) 
60.0 % 40.0 % 
0 
14 12 2 (Medium, 20–30 %)
53.8 % 46.2 % 
0 
14 26 13 3 (High, 30–45 %) 
26.4 % 49.1 % 24.5 % 
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52.9 % 47.1 % 
Note: ρ =  0.59 (p << 0.0001); γ =  0,74 (p << 0,0001). Values of the young urban popu-
lation growth rates have been calculated on the basis of the UN database (UN 
Population Division 2010). Data there are provided for data points separated by five-
year periods; so, this stipulated our choice of five-year periods. For sources on in-
ternal conflict intensity see notes to Table 5. Only countries with not less than one 
million population in 1960 are accounted for in this Table, in Table 5, and in  
Figs 43–45.  
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Fig. 43. Percentage of countries with low (< 500 violent deaths) in-
tensity of internal violent conflicts (for 1960–2005 period) in 
respective groups  
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Fig. 44. Percentage of countries with very high (> 100,000 violent 
deaths) intensity of internal violent conflicts (for 1960–
2005) in respective groups  
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Fig. 45. Distribution of countries with an especially high (> 100,000 
violent deaths) intensity of violent internal conflicts (for 
1960–2005 period) among respective groups 
Table 5.  Internal political conflicts of 1960–2005 that resulted in 
especially numerous (> 100,000) violent deaths  
No Country 
Year of 
the be-
ginning 
Year 
of the 
end 
Event Violent deaths 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Algeria 1992 2002 Islamist rebellion, civil war   ~100,000 
2 Angola 1975 2002 Civil war ~550,000 
3 Afghanistan 1978 * Afghan revolution, civil wars 
(complicated by foreign interven-
tions)  
~1,800,000 
4 Bangladesh 1971 1971 War for independence from West 
Pakistan  
~1,250,000 
5 Burma/ 
Myanmar 
Before 
1960 
* Civil wars ~130,000 
6 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1992 1995 The Bosnian civil war ~175,000 
7 Burundi 1993 1993 Civil war, mass killings of hutu 
and tutsi (mainly hutu were killed) 
~200,000** 
8 Vietnam 1965 1973 Civil war in South Vietnam with 
interventions on the part of the 
USA and North Vietnam  
~1,700,000 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
9 Guatemala 1960 1996 Civil war ~200,000 
1960 1965 Congolese crisis ~100,000 10 Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
(Zaire) 
1998 2009 Civil wars ~3,800,000  
11 Indonesia 1965 1966 Coup attempt, mass executions  ~400,000 
12 Iraq 1961 * Kurd upsurges in the north, Shia 
insurrections in the south, political 
upheavals of the 2000s 
~100,000 
13 Iran 1978 1979 Islamic revolution ~100,000 
14 Yemen  1962 1970 Revolution and civil war ~100,000 
15 Cambodia 1970 1991 Civil wars and their consequences 
(complicated by foreign interven-
tions) 
~2,500,000   
16 China 1966 1969 ‘Cultural revolution’ From 
2,000,000 
to 7,000,000 
17 Laos 1960 1973 Civil war within the Second Indo-
china War  
From 
70,000 to 
250,000 
18 Liberia 1989 1997 Civil wars  ~150,000 
19 Lebanon 1975 1990 Civil war complicated by numer-
ous cases of foreign intervention 
~150,000 
20 Mozam-
bique 
1975 1992 Civil war ~1,000,000 
21 Nigeria 1966 1970 Coup, civil war of Biafra  From 
600,000 to 
1,000,000 
22 Rwanda 1994 1994 Civil war, mass killings of the  
Tutsi  
~937,000 **  
23 Somalia 1991 * Civil war, state breakdown, chaos, 
anarchy  
~400,000**  
1955 1972 Civil war ~500,000 
1983 * Civil war ~1,900,000 
24 Sudan 
2003 * Darfur conflict  From 
70,000 to 
more than 
180,000  
25 Uganda 1979 1986 Civil wars ~300,000** 
 
26 The Philip-
pines 
Since 
1972 
* War against guerillas  From 
50,000  
to 150,000  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
27 Chad 1965 1997 Civil wars From 
50,000 
to 100,000 
28 Eritrea 1962 1992 War for independence and internal 
conflicts  
~1,400,000 
29 Ethiopia 1962 1992 Civil wars ~1,400,0007  
Note: * Events unfinished, violence continuing in some form.  
Sources: Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Bercovitch and Jackson 1997; Clodfelter 1992; 
Crowder, Fage, and Oliver 1986; Lorraine 1995; Palmowski 1997; Project 
Ploughshares 2008; Rummel 1994; Small and Singer 1982; Totten 1997; 
Wallechinsky 1995; White 2010a; 2010b.  
The research reveals that for 1960–2005 period the probability of major internal 
violent political conflicts in countries with very low (less than 15 % increase 
per five years) young urban population growth rates was very low. For coun-
tries with intermediate values of these rates (20–30 % increase per five years) 
the probability of such conflicts was close to 50 %, that is one chance out of 
two. However, even for this group of countries there was not a single occur-
rence of a particularly violent internal political upheaval in the given period. In 
countries with high (30–45 % increase per five years) young urban population 
growth rates the probability of avoiding the major internal political upheavals 
falls down to a very low level (about one chance out of four). Besides, the 
probability of particularly violent civil wars becomes very high in these coun-
tries (also about one chance out of four).  
However, particularly deep internal political problems were encountered in 
those countries in which the young urban population growth rates were very 
high (> 45 % increase per five years) in the period under consideration. Out of 
34 countries of this group NOT A SINGLE ONE managed to avoid major po-
litical shocks. Besides, the risk of particularly violent civil war occurrence was 
very high for these countries (about one chance out of two).  
Forecasting the Dynamics of Sociopolitical Instability  
in the African Countries in 2020–2050  
The results obtained in our research can well be used for predicting the risks of 
sociopolitical instability for the countries being on the verge of escaping from 
the Malthusian trap, in the process of escape, or having escaped from it re-
cently.  
Working out of such forecasts is currently made remarkably easier by the 
fact that UN Population Division has developed urbanization dynamics fore-
                                                          
7 General number of deaths in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1962–1992.  
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casts for all the African countries, as well as age structure dynamics forecasts 
up to 2050 (UN Population Division 2010). Synthesis of these predictions al-
lowed us to make a synthetic forecast regarding the dynamics of structural-
demographic instability for the African countries in this period.  
It is noteworthy that in our prediction only ‘positive results’ are really sig-
nificant (i.e. the results revealing the presence of high political instability risk 
in a certain country in a certain period). We are inclined to interpret such results 
as an evidence of a real risk of political instability in the given place at the giv-
en time (if, of course, respective governments do not undertake adequate meas-
ures in proper time). On the other hand, in our opinion, ‘negative results’ can-
not be viewed as a guarantee of absence of political upheavals in the given 
country up to 2050 (as we do not claim that the reasons of violent political up-
heavals can be reduced to structural-demographic factors only).  
*   *   * 
Our forecast has produced rather different results for different Subsaharan 
African countries.   
No serious demographic structural risks of the type in questions are fore-
casted after 2015 for some Subsaharan countries (especially in Southern Af-
rica). Let us regard, for example, the forecast for Botswana (see Fig. 46):  
 
Fig. 46. Young urban population dynamics (thousands) in Botswana, 
forecast up to 2050  
No serious structural-demographic risks of this type are forecasted for many 
countries of Tropical Africa, for example, Gabon (see Fig. 47):  
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Fig. 47. Young urban population dynamics (thousands) in Gabon, 
forecast up to 2050  
While in the Gabon case the young urban population growth curve quite clearly 
demonstrates the absence of major structural-demographic risks, for some other 
Tropical African countries it is necessary (in order to detect it) to carry out 
an analysis of time series generated by our forecast. A bright example here is 
represented by the Ghana case (see Fig. 48).   
 
 
Fig. 48. Young urban population dynamics (thousands) in Ghana, 
forecast up to 2050  
Indeed, in application to Ghana the forecasted situation may seem truly threat-
ening, as by 2050 the young urban population there is likely to grow almost 
threefold (i.e., 200 %; while in the cases considered above this growth did not 
exceed 50 %).  
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However, a simple analysis of the corresponding time series shows that 
the situation is not so threatening. Indeed, the forecasted dynamics of rela-
tive growth rates of the young urban population has the following shape 
(Fig. 49).  
 
Fig. 49. Forecasted dynamics of relative growth rates of the young  
urban population in Ghana up to 2050, % per five-year periods 
Thus, in the following decade urban youth relative growth rates are forecasted 
to be decreasing in Ghana up to a quite safe level of less than 14 % during  
five years; in the 2020s these rates are going to stabilize (at the same rather 
safe level), while after 2030 they will decline further on. A similar dynam-
ics is demonstrated by the absolute growth rates of the young urban popula-
tion (see Fig. 50).  
 
Fig. 50. Forecasted dynamics of absolute growth rates (in thousands) 
of the young urban population in Ghana up to 2050, per five-
year periods  
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Thus, no increase in absolute growth rates of the young urban population is 
forecasted in Ghana for the next decade. According to the same forecast, a cer-
tain increase in these rates is expected in the 2020s, but it will be very moderate 
(25 % during ten years). After 2030 the absolute growth rates are forecasted to 
start declining, and by the 2040s they are expected to fall below the current 
level.  
However, the forecast indicates the presence of high structural-demo-
graphic risks for a wide range of Tropical African countries (see Table 6 below 
for a full list). Fortunately, in no case the urban youth growth rates are fore-
casted to exceed the critical level of 45 % per five years (let us remember that 
in the recent decades not a single country which crossed this level managed to 
avoid major internal sociopolitical conflicts, while in half of the cases particu-
larly violent internal political upheavals occurred). Along with that, a number 
of tropical African countries are forecasted to get into a very dangerous zone of 
30–45 % (let us remember that in the recent decades only a quarter of countries 
found in this zone managed to avoid major internal political conflicts, while in 
a quarter of cases particularly violent internal political upheavals were ob-
served).  
Tanzania is among the countries of high structural-demographic risk.  
The general dynamics of the urban population in this country is forecasted as 
follows (see Fig. 51):  
 
Fig. 51. Young urban population dynamics in Tanzania up to 2050, 
thousands  
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Thus, in 2005–2050 an almost six-fold increase in the young urban population 
is forecasted for Tanzania, while in the 2020s the relative growth rates of this 
indicator will exceed the critical level of 30 % per five years.  
However, the most serious structural-demographic risks are predicted for 
Niger (see Fig. 52):   
 
Fig. 52. Young urban population dynamics in Niger up to 2050, thou-
sands 
Thus, in 2000–2050 the young urban population of Niger will increase by 
an order of magnitude, while in the second half of the 2010s the relative growth 
rates of this indicator will exceed the critical level of 30 % per five years, while 
in the early 2020s they will exceed an even more dangerous level of 40 % dur-
ing five years. These rates will decrease to relatively safe levels only in the late 
2040s (see Fig. 53). 
Andrey V. Korotayev, Sergey Yu. Malkov, and Leonid E. Grinin 255 
 
Fig. 53. Forecasted dynamics of relative growth rates of the young 
urban population in Niger up to 2050, % per five-year periods  
Besides, in Niger an increase by an order of magnitude (in comparison to 2000 
level) in the absolute growth rates of the young urban population is forecasted 
by 2030 (see Fig. 54). 
 
Fig. 54. Forecasted dynamics of absolute growth rates (in thousands) 
of the young urban population in Niger up to 2050, per five-
year periods 
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In conclusion, let us present a summary forecast of structural-demographic risks 
of political destabilization in the Subsaharan African countries up to 2050 (see 
Table 6).  
Table 6. Summary forecast of structural-demographic risks of politi-
cal destabilization in Subsaharan African countries up to 
2050  
Country 
Years of max-
imum urban 
youth growth 
rates 
Urban 
youth 
growth rates 
(% in five 
years) in 
those years 
Period of par-
ticularly high 
structural-
demographic 
risks of political 
destabilization 
Structural-
demographic 
risk level 
Niger 2021–2025 41.8 2021–2030 Very high 
Malawi  2016–2020 39 2015–2025 High 
Burkina Faso  2021–2025 38.7 2021–2030 High 
Uganda 2021–2025 33.1 2021–2030 High 
Eritrea  2021–2025 32.5 2021–2030 High  
Tanzania 2021–2025 30.6 2021–2030 High  
Kenya  2021–2025 30.2 2021–2030 High 
Rwanda 2021–2025 29.6 2021–2030 Medium  
Chad 2016–2020 28.5 2016–2025 Medium  
Burundi 2026–2030 28.1 2026–2035 Medium 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
2016–2020 27.7 2016–2025 Medium 
Mozambique  2021–2025 27.4 2021–2030 Medium  
Somalia  2016–2020 27.4 2016–2025 Medium  
Ethiopia  2016–2020 26.7 2016–2025 Medium 
Gambia 2016–2020 26.5 2016–2025 Medium  
Sierra Leone 2016–2020 25.4 2016–2025 Medium 
Madagascar 2016–2020 25.2 2016–2020 Medium  
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